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NO LAUGHING MATTER: HUMOR AND




Any serious attempt to study humor is fraught with risk. In focus-
ing our analytic gaze on the joke, the funny story, or the trick-by
interpreting them, contextualizing them, and speculating on their sig-
nificance-we become the ultimate wet blanket. Poker-faced and
pencil poised, we are the ones who need to have the joke explained to
them, or worse, the ones who explain the joke to others. In fact, in
seeking to assign meaning to the apparently meaningless, we become
the joke. A "Far Side" cartoon, entitled "Analyzing Humor," by Gary
Larson' captures this irony beautifully. Pointing to a diagram of a
clown, a professor is delivering a lecture to a room full of students.
Pinned to the back of his lab coat is a sign that reads "kick me."
Knowingly assuming these risks, in this paper we intend to discuss and
speculate on the meaning of humor and law.2
The social study of humor is at best a marginal sub-field of the soci-
ology of culture. However, its peripheral status is in many ways per-
plexing due to the ubiquitous and distinctively social (some have even
argued uniquely human) character of humor. Even in the most des-
perate and dire circumstances-in mental hospitals, prisons, and hos-
pices-people make fun. They tell jokes, share humorous stories, and
play tricks on one another.
* Patricia Ewick is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Clark University, Worcester Mas-
sachusetts. Susan S. Silbey is a Professor of Sociology at Wellesley College, Wellesley, Massachu-
setts. We are indebted to Erin York for her excellent research assistance.
1. Gary Larson, The Far Side Gallery 162 (Far Works, Inc. 1984).
2. See PATRICiA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THi COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE 1998 (analyzing the meanings of law and legality in everyday life). In this book,
we distinguish between law, referring to the formal institutions, actors, and legality, an emergent
structure of social life that manifests itself in diverse places, including, but not limited to, formal
institutional settings and actors. We try to use the term "legality" to refer to the meanings,
sources of authority, and cultural practices that are commonly recognized as legal, regardless of
who employs them or for what ends. Here, however, we eschew the term "legality" and direct
readers who are interested in the sociological theory of structures of social action and legality as
a structure of action to The Common Place of Law.
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Furthermore, in ignoring, or assigning little importance to, humor,
scholars commit the cardinal sin of social science: accepting as un-
problematic and self-evident the folk meaning of some social practice.
According to the folk understandings, humor, by definition, is not se-
rious. Humor is fun precisely because it seems to stand outside, and
denies tough, intractable, and often all too tragic reality. By contrast,
humor is ephemeral. The joke and the funny story end with a punch
line that elicits an immediate response, laughter, which itself is short-
lived. Fantastic and fleeting, humor is fun and funny precisely because
it makes such a small claim on us, unlike the serious. Or so it would
appear.
II. "KICK ME:" ANALYZING HUMOR
In this paper we aim to identify and interpret humorous stories, as
opposed to jokes (a distinction we will explain in a moment), that peo-
ple tell about law. Our purpose in such an analysis will also become
clearer shortly. We begin this exercise by assuming that something
significant about the law and ordinary legal conscibusness is revealed
in humorous stories. In fact, we make a stronger claim that something
serious is being accomplished, not merely depicted, in the telling of
these stories. Before proceeding to our analysis of humor and the law,
however, a few definitions and distinctions are required. First, what is
humor, and how is it recognized? Secondly, what analytically useful
distinctions can we draw among types or genres of humor?
III. WHAT'S (so) FUNNY?
Anthropologists studying humor have traditionally assumed that
humor is culturally specific and can reliably be identified by a cultural
outsider (such as the anthropologist) only by the presence of laughter.
For instance, while an American might be disturbed or disgusted by
the Dogon practice of throwing excrement at one another, the Dogon
apparently find this extremely funny as indicated by the hilarity and
laughter it provokes.3
According to Professor Mary Douglas,4 however, laughter alone is
not a valid indicator of a joke since people do not always laugh upon
hearing a humorous story. Alternatively, people sometimes laugh
when nothing funny has transpired (i.e., out of politeness, upon being
3. Radcliffe-Brown, A.R., On Joking Relationships in 13 AFRICA No. 3, 195-210 (1940).
4. Mary Douglas, Jokes, in RETmINKING POPULAR CULTURE: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES
IN CULTURAL STUDIES, 291-310 (Chandra Makerji & Michael Schudson eds., 1991).
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tickled, or as a result of extreme nervousness). Following Freud5 and
Bergson,6 Douglas claims that there is a structure of ideas characteris-
tic of humor, a "joke pattern," that can be identified independently
from any response on the part of the audience. This pattern consists of
a play upon form which
brings into relation disparate elements in such a way that one ac-
cepted pattern is challenged by the appearance of another which in
some way was hidden in the first .... [A]ny recognizable joke falls
into this joke pattern which needs two elements, the juxtaposition of
a control against that which is controlled, this juxtaposition being
such that the [subordinate] triumphs.7
A number of elements of this definition bear emphasizing. First, a
joke involves the juxtaposition of disparate elements. This feature of a
joke imparts a quality of unpredictability and surprise. A second as-
pect of the definition is the idea of challenge. The two disparate ele-
ments are not simply juxtaposed, they are placed in a sort of
competition. This contest imparts to the joke form the quality of sus-
pense. Third, a joke is realized when the weaker of the combatants,
the "controlled," wins this competition. This feature of the joke pat-
tern imparts the quality of justice.
Combining these elements we can see that a joke always provides a
glimpse of a world up-ended, "the leveling of hierarchy, the triumph
of intimacy over formality, of unofficial values over official ones."8
While this humorous world may not be utopian, it always challenges
the inevitability of the world as it is, and thus paves the way for a
world as it might be. It is for this reason, we suspect, that George
Orwell (the great dystopian) claimed that "every joke is a tiny
revolution." 9
IV. TYPES OF HUMOR
In analyzing humor, it is useful to distinguish what have been called
standardized and spontaneous jokes. The standardized form is what
we typically refer to in the vernacular as a "joke." A joke has a clear
beginning, middle, and ending. As jokes circulate, in numerous tel-
lings across social situations, they change over time. At the same time
as standardized jokes evolve and transform over time, they also exist
5. SIGMuND FREUD, WIT AND ITS RELATION To Tm UNCONSCIOUS, (trans. after A. A. Brill,
1916).
6. See HENRI BERGSON, LE RRE: ESSAi SUR LA SIGNIFICAnON Du COMIQUE (1950).
7. See Douglas, supra note 4, at 296.
8. Id. at 297.
9. 3 GEORGE ORWELL, THE COLLECTED ESSAYS: JOURNALISM AND LETrERS OF GEORGE
ORWELL 284 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds., 1968).
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as cultural objects, transcending and resisting the particular exper-
iences of any one person or group. The phrase, "did you hear the one
about," linguistically indexes the imminence of a standardized joke.
The phrase anticipates the possibility of a prior hearing, which would
abort the telling insofar as it would deprive the joke of its unpredict-
ability. The phrase, "did you hear the one about," also refers to the
joke that is about to be told, rather than to a situation the teller claims
to have experienced. Most importantly, the standardized joke con-
tains the complete joke pattern in its verbal form. The disparate ele-
ments are juxtaposed in competition and the punch line declares the
winner, all in the tidy package known as a joke.
The spontaneous joke is harder to recognize or interpret because
the joke pattern is not fully contained in the utterance. A spontane-
ous joke corresponds more closely to a story about something we wit-
nessed or experienced. In this sense, the spontaneous joke is
particular and non-idealized. A spontaneous joke is not, in other
words, a condensation of collective experience as much as a report of
specific events. As such, the spontaneous joke tends to be less effi-
cient in accomplishing the juxtaposition, competition, and triumph
necessary for a joke. To achieve the status of a joke, a story must spill
over into the social situation, drawing upon the tacit understandings
and interpretive frames of the audience. When such a spontaneous
joke fails to strike its audience as funny, the excuse typically offered
by the would-be joke teller is that "you had to be there." The reason
for the joke's failure suggests the importance of situationally embed-
ded information to the organization of the elements of the joke.
For all that the spontaneous joke lacks in efficiency, in at least one
important way, it trumps the standardized joke as a form of humor
and social data. The glimpse of the "world as it might be" is all the
more compelling because it is not abstracted from general experience.
The spontaneous joke provides a glimpse of power upended despite
the fact that the messy, intractable reality of everyday life tends to
obscure the contradictions and social control that comprise the joke.
What the spontaneous joke lacks in elegance and impact, it more than
makes up for in terms of insight.
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JOKE
The paradigmatic question for the sociologist of humor is this: what
does the joke form reveal about the social situation in which, or about
which, it is told? The assumption behind this question is that jokes
reveal, or express, the contradictions and ambiguities that characterize
social structure. Professor Douglas makes this point emphatically,
[Vol. 50:559
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The one social condition necessary for a joke to be enjoyed is that
the social group in which it is received should [display] the formal
characteristics of a 'told' joke: that is, a dominant pattern of rela-
tions [should be ruptured or] challenged by another. If there is no
joke in the social structure, no other joking can appear. 10
Mary Douglas's use of the evocative phrase "joke in the social
structure" may be misleading and therefore requires some clarifica-
tion." Douglas is not claiming that the structural joke is funny.
Rather, she is asserting that the situation is structured in such a way as
to contain the components necessary for the making of a joke: dispa-
rate, or contradictory elements, a tension between those elements,
and the possibility of victory by a subordinate.
"Humor is produced," according to Professor Michael Mulkay, "out
of the ambiguities, contradictions, and interpretive difficulties that oc-
cur regularly in [a social] context. 1 2 These contradictions constitute
the raw materials out of which the told joke is constructed. The hu-
mor is a result of articulating those contradictions in such a way as to
make them manifest.
For example, in a classic study of the role of humor in an institu-
tional setting, Professor Rose Coser examined how psychiatrists used
jokes to mediate the contradictions produced by the social organiza-
tion of their professional practice.' 3 Coser observed professional staff
meetings attended by senior psychiatric staff, junior psychiatric staff,
visiting psychiatrists, and auxiliary staff. She found that the jokes told
during these meetings (of which there was an average of five per
meeting) tended to be directed downward in the hierarchy with senior
psychiatrists telling more jokes at the expense of junior psychiatrists.14
Coser interpreted these jokes and their downward trajectory as re-
flecting a structurally produced tension in the relationship between
junior and senior staff.15 The meetings were intended to provide a
forum for practicing psychiatrists to present difficult cases and review
their treatment protocols. 16 The senior psychiatrists were expected to
point out any problems or incompetence on the part of any junior
staff. However, criticizing the junior staff in such a formal and public
arena might undermine the junior psychiatrists' abilities to perform
10. See Douglas, supra note 4, at 298 (emphasis added).
11. Id.
12. MICHAEL MULKAY, ON HUMOR: ITS NATURE AND ITS PLACE IN MODERN SOCIETY 169
(1988).
13. Rose Laub Coser, Laughter Among Colleagues: A Study of the Functions of Humor
Among the Staff of a Mental Hospital, 23 PSYCHIATRY, 81-95 (1960).





the vital and difficult tasks for which they may not have been fully
qualified.' 7
Jokes became the way in which criticism could be voiced without
humiliating or discouraging the junior members of the staff. For in-
stance, in one case, a junior psychiatrist reported that he had adopted
the practice of accepting his patients' delusions of having killed some-
one. A senior member of the staff responded to this unconventional
approach by saying, "[l]et me mention that there [are] precedents [for]
your method. There once was a patient who went around barking like
a dog [laughter starts here] and the therapist barked back [rest of the
sentence is drowned in laughter]."' 8
Coser attributes a safety valve function to humor. The jokes told at
the expense of the junior staff members deflect attention away from
the structurally generated tensions that might otherwise disrupt the
conventional modes of apprenticeship training. We will address
whether humor has a subversive or hegemonic role in greater detail
later.
VI. LAW AND HUMOR
What types of humorous stories do people tell about law? What do
these stories reveal about the joke in the social structure of law?
From 1990 to 1993, we interviewed 430 randomly selected persons liv-
ing in four counties in New Jersey. The interviews were lengthy (aver-
aging approximately two or more hours) and relatively unstructured.
The interview consisted largely of open-ended questions about how
persons experienced and interpreted events in their lives. Overall, the
interview was designed in such a way as to provide opportunities for
people to offer narratives about law. We inquired about any
problems, conflicts and experiences the interviewees had in the course
of their daily interactions and relationships. We also asked about how
each person responded to these problems, whether they invoked the
law or pursued other non-legal means of redress or accommodation.
Through the thousands of stories and accounts we collected in the
course of these interviews, we mapped the law's presence or absence
in everyday life.
In the 140 interviews we had fully transcribed, we identified humor-
ous stories by relying on a number of indicators. First, we examined
any story or anecdote that made an explicit reference to the situations
as being funny or humorous. People often characterized their stories
17. Id. at 86.
18. Id. at 91.
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with phrases such as, "this really cracked me up" or "it was hilarious."
We also included in our sample any story or remark accompanied by
laughter (of significant duration to have been noted in the transcript).
Finally, we analyzed these stories in terms of the joke pattern outlined
by Douglas1 9 described above. In the spontaneous stories presented
in the interview, these elements often emerged contextually and
implicitly.
As previously mentioned, spontaneous jokes are more difficult to
identify and appreciate than standardized jokes. The spontaneous
joke, or story, is produced out of the stuff of everyday life, with all of
its irrelevant and inconvenient details. The story is typically offered
without the benefit of careful editing. The story also makes an im-
plicit claim to be an accurate account of an actual event. Without the
literary license accorded the standardized joke, the spontaneous joke
tends to lack the elements necessary to produce the punch at the end
of the story.
A number of interesting patterns emerged when we examined the
stories people told. First, and most notably, was the relative scarcity of
humor in these stories. People, it appears, rarely find anything funny
about their first-hand encounters and experiences with the law. This
fact is all the more puzzling given the abundance of law jokes that
circulate. 20
Although it is possible that the interview format inhibits the telling
of humorous stories, we do not think that this fully explains why hu-
mor is so rare. The interview was, as we explained, long, open-ended,
informal, and in almost all cases, rated by the respondents to be a very
pleasant experience. Moreover, the fact that we did collect a large
number of stories also suggests that there was sufficient opportunity
to share funny stories, if the respondent so chose.
The most plausible explanation for the dearth of humor stories is
also the most obvious one. While people find the law funny, they do
not tend to find their own experiences with the law humorous. Recall
that one difference between a standardized joke and a spontaneous
joke is the relationship each joke has to a lived experience. Standard-
ized jokes distill events and experiences, condensing and typifying the
events and characters. Additionally, standardized jokes are efficient
and self-contained vehicles that convey the contest and triumph, thus
offering vicarious experience. In contrast, humorous stories are usu-
ally (however loosely) based on the storyteller's own experiences.
19. See Douglas, supra note 4.
20. See MARC GALANTER, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. The Conniving Claimant: Changing
Images of Misuse of Legal Remedies, 647 (2001).
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Therefore, it is clear that while we may laugh at the law from a dis-
tance, we are less likely to do so up close.
Humor was not, however, altogether absent from the stories people
told. An analysis of these stories reveals something interesting about
law in American popular culture and consciousness. As we predicted,
at the heart of the joke was a contest between a citizen who exper-
ienced herself in the situation as less qualified, with fewer resources
and connections, up against (at least ostensibly and initially) a more
powerful opponent. However, the humor did not seem to come
merely from the less powerful contestant winning against poor odds.
The stories that were offered to us as funny, were those in which win-
ning was a result of the law, or a legal actor, overplaying the power or
authority brought to the contest. Therefore, the law is funny, it seems,
when it becomes a caricature and reveals itself to be a buffoon.
A. The Expert as Clown
In one interview, a man, we call him Fred Bridges, 21 related a con-
fusing account of a traffic accident in which his wife had been in-
volved. Two weeks after the accident, the man who hit Mrs. Bridges's
car made a civil complaint against her for disregarding a stop sign. Mr.
Bridges tells the following story:
So, we went to court in Nutley and the judge said that this is the way
that it goes. My wife gets up and tells her side, the guy gets up and
tells his side. They can question each other, and then the judge
makes a decision. My wife gets up and says, "Your honor, I was
sitting at the stop sign, I stopped, I looked, I didn't see anything. A
woman came up to make a left turn in front of me. She waved for
me to go. I looked again and still didn't see anything, so I just
started to turn. Maybe five or ten feet and boom this guy came out
of nowhere. I never saw him.
Fred Bridges went on in his story to contrast his wife's matter of fact
account of the events preceding the accident with an account of the
plaintiff's performance. According to Fred Bridges, the plaintiff
got up there and made a big speech about the clothes he had on [at
the time of the accident]. He tried to introduce as evidence a
bloody sock. I mean, the court was cracking up. This guy thought he
was Perry Mason. You had to see it to believe it. He was a profes-
21. In accordance with Bluebook Rule 17.14., The BLUEBOOK: A Uniform System of Citation
121 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000) the name of the interviewee and the
location of the interview are required to be given. However, in order to remain consistent with
the protocols of the National Science Foundation that supported the research (SES 9123561) and
the Institutional Review Boards of Wellesley College and Clark University, the names of the
interviewees will remain anonymous. In general, the interviewees were selected from the state
of New Jersey and the interviews were conducted from 1990-1993.
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sional too. He was a tax lawyer. He really thought he was it. He had
a suit on. He had a sling on. He got up and said, "Oh your honor, I
was going straight through the intersection when she was stopped at
the stop sign." The judge said, "You just said that she was stopped
at the stop sign; I can't give her a ticket if she was stopped. Case
dismissed. Get out of my court." The guy was saying, "but, but,
but," and everybody was laughing. He hung himself in court.
What everyone in court (including the storyteller) apparently found
so funny about this event was the contrast between the tax lawyer's
pretensions (his clothes, his use of the bloody sock as evidence) and
his incompetence (in undermining his own case). In this story, legal
authority and expertise, presumably held by the plaintiff, the profes-
sional, is revealed to be useless.
B. Law as Straight Man
Versions of this story were repeated a number of times by different
respondents. In each of these stories, the law is revealed to be a fool,
not by violating its authority, but by enacting that authority with an
earnestness devoid of perspective or common sense. In one story, the
law's foolishness lies in exaggerating the seriousness of a welfare vio-
lation and treating what the storyteller thought should be relatively
minor as a serious crime. In this story, a former welfare mother re-
counts an experience she had in court involving a disputed welfare
benefit. When asked if she could tell us more about this experience,
she replied, "[i]t was funny." When probed as to what was funny
about the story, the interviewee went on to explain,
[tihere were people up there that owed them like twenty-five, thirty
thousand dollars (as opposed to her debt of $3,200). And it was a
really funny day. I mean, they fingerprinted us (here she laughs).
Took our picture. But they told me all I had to do was go up there
and get it expunged, or something. I said the heck with that. What
do I want to do that for, I'm no big time criminal (laughs). I was
just trying to survive and take care of my kids .... It was hilarious.
In this story, the down to earth, common sense logic of the respon-
dent who is just trying to survive is contrasted with the extreme (and
thus comical) measures taken by the court system that processes her
as if she were "a big time criminal." The fact that the charges were
subsequently dropped serves as the punch line to the developing joke
about the excessive allocation of official resources and attention.
C. Peeking Beneath the Veil of Law
A great deal of what people find funny about law lies in exposing
the mundanity of law. The stories accompanied with laughter typically
2000]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
revealed law's power and grandeur to be a facade disguising its venal-
ity and fallibility.
In telling us about a court experience following a car accident, Paul
Hughes mentioned that although he had consulted with his lawyer,
they agreed that the lawyer did not need to be present at the hearing.
However, the other driver involved in the accident did bring a lawyer.
"Well, the guy was quite elderly, and he got very confused when his
lawyer was questioning him. It didn't help him. The [elderly driver]
guy kept saying, 'now what was it that you wanted me to say?' Every-
one was laughing."
In this story, Mr. Hughes makes a number of observations about the
law. First, he asserts, if only implicitly, that he was better off without a
lawyer. Although the other driver had benefit of counsel, "it [having
a lawyer] didn't help him," according to Paul. Second, the old man's
naive queries about what he was supposed to say made the lawyer's
scripting and prompting manifest. In illustrating the ways lawyers and
clients construct the facts, the law was likewise revealed to be a game
of strategy, rather than a search for truth and justice. Indeed, implicit
in Mr. Hughes' account is the belief that both the elderly gentleman
and the law were confused.
D. Playing a Joke on the Law
The most elaborate (and rehearsed) stories we heard were those in
which the storyteller did not simply witness the law's weaknesses,
flaws, and fallibility, but actually manipulated these features to their
own advantage. In these instances, people were not simply peering
beneath the veil of law's pretensions of power and grandeur. In
manipulating the situation, citizens were exercising their own power
over law. In these accounts, the storyteller is cast in the role of the
protagonist who lays a trap for legal authorities in order to secure an
advantage.
One woman, Nell Pearson, recounted the difficulty she experienced
years before trying to get compensated by an insurance company for
losses she had suffered in a car accident. When the insurance com-
pany's lawyer called her to negotiate a lower settlement, she realized
the futility of her claim. With pleasure and pride, Nell told us how she
used her knowledge of lawyers' billing practices to make the insurance
company nonetheless pay the disputed amount (albeit not to her).
They turned it over to their insurance company (and I got a call
from the insurance company's lawyer) wanting to settle the night
before the small claims hearing. We were haggling over fifty dol-
lars. I had already decided that he probably wasn't going to pay me
[Vol. 50:559
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the fifty dollars but I would get fifty dollars of his time on the tele-
phone. So, after about a half an hour, he was screaming .... And
he said, "I'm just going to have to see you in small claims." I knew
he didn't want to go. It was too small an amount of money. So I
said, "That's okay, you don't have to do it, I've gotten my fifty dol-
lars out of you." And he said "Is that what you were doing?" And I
said, "Yeah. I know what lawyers are worth." And he said, "You've
got your fifty dollars."
What apparently made this ruse funny, and not simply crafty, was
the fact that Nell neither deceived, misled, nor in any way corrupted
the law or legal ethics. She merely took advantage of what lawyers
routinely do, reckon their time as more valuable than anyone else's
time. Once again, the pretensions of law, in this case represented by
the attorney, made it an easy target.
VII. No LAUGHING MATTER
A negative example supports our interpretation that law's joke is
internal to legality, that it consists of catching the law doing (or per-
haps over-doing) precisely what it is supposed to be doing. In the
following story, a woman told us about the time she pulled over a
police officer for going through a traffic light. Notably, she did not
think that this reversal of roles was at all funny, although the police
officer did find it amusing.
I was riding down Hadden Avenue one day and the cop pulled up in
back of me. All of a sudden, he turned on his lights and siren.
Scared the mess out of me. I almost hit a parked car. And the only
thing he did it for was to pass the light. Then he turned everything
off and was cruising on down the road, you know? And I very nicely
cruised on down the road and pulled him over and told him exactly
what I thought about it. [Interviewer: What did he say?] I didn't
appreciate it. He laughed. I told him you wouldn't be laughing if I
turned his badge number in ... because they are supposed to ob-
serve all speed laws just like we are.
If we contemplate what is not considered humorous in this story, we
catch additional glimpses of the sources and meanings of what is de-
fined as funny. On its surface, this story may seem to conform to the
conventional joke pattern: a contest between a superior and a
subordinate culminating in the triumph of the less powerful. The
story encapsulates the reversal of the expected that is so often defined
as the sine qua non of a joke or funny story. However, in the encoun-
ter that Olive Washington had with the cop, she found nothing funny.
This negative example leads us to conclude that a law which secures
its advantage by violating its own rules of play is not funny. Rather,
such situations present us with bully cops, corrupt judges, or incompe-
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tent lawyers. For there to be a joke, it must, as Douglas pointed out,
inhere the social structure.22 Therefore, what is the joke in law's
structure?
VIII. LAW'S JOKE
Recall that the structural joke refers to ambiguities and contradic-
tions in the situation that permit the told joke. In contrast to humor,
the register of seriousness requires an univocality, an insistence that
there is one truth, one reality. However, the univocality assumed by
the serious mode rests precariously on a pile of assumptions (asser-
tions) about the world that are unsustainable. Social life is, if nothing
else, dynamic, and continually undoes its own claims. As Mulkay has
noted, "[h]umor occurs because mundane, serious discourse simply
cannot cope with its own interpretive multiplicity. '23
According to this argument, humor can be traced to internal contra-
dictions that exist within social settings or social institutions. In the
case of law, we did find some clear and persistent contradictions wo-
ven throughout the stories (funny and not funny) that people shared.
People did not experience or interpret the law in a singular, consistent
way. At times, people depicted the law as sublime and transcendent.
This image was a face of law that stood apart and above the fray of
daily disputes and disappointments. This face of law was associated
with impartiality, disinterestedness, and power, both governed and en-
abled by known rules and procedures.
At other times, people (often the same person) spoke of the law as
a game in which individuals pursued their own interests, and the ensu-
ing contest produced winners and losers depending upon the skill and
craft of the contestants. This face of law was associated with the mun-
dane, the venal, and the self-interested. In such situations, people do-
mesticated the law, rendering it accessible, relevant and responsive to
their daily lives.
These vastly different understandings of law, as we mentioned, were
invoked in relation to one another. Out of these contradictory ver-
sions of the law, a durable legal fabric is woven; together they consti-
tute the warp and woof of law's legitimacy, power, and meaning.
These alternative, contradictory images actually work in tandem to in-
sulate law from sustained and disabling critique. If law were believed
to be all that it claimed-a government of laws and not of men, pro-
viding equal justice for all who come before it-its legitimacy and du-
22. See Douglas, supra note 4, at 299-300.
23. See Mulkay, supra note 12, at 214.
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rability would be fragile. Support for the rule of law would easily
evaporate in the face of abundant evidence of unequal treatment, in-
determinate rules, corrupt police, and incompetent lawyers. Recog-
nizing that law is also a game played by interested actors, not only
levels our aspirations, it leavens out commitments to the rule of law
and generates support by authorizing ordinary citizens as central play-
ers. If, however, law is understood only as a game through which bet-
ter endowed players secure their advantage, it would be impossible to
generate the legitimacy and support necessary to sustain it as an
institution.
In fact, Americans see the law as both sacred and profane, transcen-
dent and very much a part of the truck of everyday life. As such, it
derives its power by straddling the everyday and the sublime. 24 These
contradictions thus represent the so-called joke in the social structure
of legality.25 The funny stories people tell about law are one of a vari-
ety of ways which they navigate through these contradictions.
However, not all of the accounts of law that we collected affirmed
the hegemony of law. Many stories, what we have called resistant or
subversive stories, 26 confronted and engaged rather than avoided the
internal contradictions of law. These storytellers described themselves
as caught within a foreign and powerful system. Rather than under-
stand legality as an arena of transcendent authority to which one de-
fers, it is understood to be an ascendant power to which one conforms.
Rather than perceiving legality as a game that one plays in order to
seek one's interests and values, people describe legality as a net in
which they are trapped and within which they struggle for freedom.
Resistant stories were those that recounted how people found ways of
avoiding, if only momentarily, law's power by taking advantage and
inverting the structural and organizational resources of law. These re-
sistant stories do not simply draw upon law's contradictory structure,
they employ the structure.
24. See PETER FrTZPATRICK, TmE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW (1992). In general, Fitzpat-
rick argues that modem law is mythic insofar as it achieves the dual effect such that the sacred
breaks through to, and exists within, the profane. See also 2 CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUC-
TuRAL ANTIHROPOLOcY 22 (1968). "Figures are created in myth mediating between the diverse
plane or sites in oppositions. Heroes or monsters straddling the chaos and order will often have a
parent who is divine .... [A]II mediating figures must retain something of that duality, namely
an ambiguous and equivocal character."
25. See FrTZPATRICK, supra note 24 135-144 (discussing the analytic distinction between legal-
ity and law). Legality refers to the structure of social action associated with law and legal institu-
tions but not confined to the formal official agencies and actors of law.
26. See EWICK & SIBLEY, supra note 2. See also Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, Subver-




For instance, Aida Marks, an African-American woman living in
Newark, told us about her difficulty getting her telephone service re-
paired. After many ignored requests, written and verbal, Ms. Marks
decided to abandon the legitimate bureaucratic route and obtain what
she needed through a ruse. Ms. Marks relied upon the same features
of racial and gender subordination which were, no doubt, implicated
in her inability to assert her rights as a consumer of a public utility in
the first place. Counting upon the prevailing assumption that poor,
black women disproportionately work as housekeepers for upper-class
families, Ms. Marks called the office of the president of the telephone
company. While claiming to be the president's housekeeper (rather
than a consumer with a complaint), she was immediately put through
to him and was able to voice her complaint. This ruse worked and her
service was immediately restored.
In this story, as in most stories of resistance, there is recognition of
law's power to define and constrain. Mrs. Marks understood her
rights as a consumer, and the obligations of a public utility to respond
to consumer complaints. At the same time, the story reveals Mrs.
Marks' acute recognition of the failure of the consumer protection ap-
paratus established by law to deliver on its own promises of equal
protection, accessibility, or justice. In resisting, citizens like Aida
Marks insert themselves within the cracks that lie between law's
power and its failures to mitigate their own powerlessness.
IX. CONCLUSION
We assumed at the outset, not yet having performed a systemic
analysis of humor in the narratives of law we collected, that the funny
stories in our data would most likely be those we categorized as resis-
tant. In fact, when analyzing and interpreting those stories that were
coded as humorous, few were tales of resistance. Our incorrect im-
pression that the resistant stories would be the funny stories came
from our own delight and amusement in hearing these stories. In
other words, we found these stories funny. What we had not fully
recognized was that while people took some pride and perhaps plea-
sure in having outsmarted the law, they rarely, if ever, found the law,
or the situation in which they resisted, funny.
The role of contradiction in sustaining legal hegemony, and the fact
that subversive stories exposed law's contradictions, casts some doubt
on Orwell's assertion that every joke constitutes a tiny revolution.27
These humorous stories of law seem to recuperate, rather than revolu-
27. See Orwell, supra note 9, at 284.
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tionize, structure. The funny stories deflect, rather than make mani-
fest, the ideological penetrations upon which they are dependent. The
circus, like the joke and other momentary and licensed acts of resis-
tance, entails an upending of the world, a reversal or inversion of cate-
gories and hierarchies. Humans put their heads willingly in the mouth
of the lion, fly through the air, and eat fire. However, the up-ended
world tends to be righted quickly, all the more secure for having been
mocked. As Balandier has claimed, "[t]he supreme ruse of power is to
allow itself to be contested ritually in order to consolidate itself more
effectively. ' 28 It is not at all clear, in other words, who is laughing
last.
28. GEORGES BALANDIER, POLMCAL ANTHROPOLOGY, 41 (1970).
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